Ares , che ha pubblicato la vulnerabilità originale, ha aggiunto un paio di aggiornamenti
Samsung mentioned the following in their press release: "Concerning the second issue, KNOX does save the encryption key required to auto-mount the container’s file system in TrustZone. However, unlike what is implied in the blog, the access to this key is strongly controlled. Only trusted system processes can retrieve it, and KNOX Trusted Boot will lock down the container key store in the event of a system compromise."
I think Samsung speaks here about their Knox Agent. At the beginning of my analysis I used geohots towelroot to gain root access on the Samsung device. During the analysis the phone wanted to update some "Samsung Security Policies". After the update the Agent blocked the root access to the phone. So this agent seems to be working like a usual Anti-Virus tool. It can only detect attacks if it knows the attack. And as we all know, Anti-Viruses are useless against unknown attacks :). This is the same for their so called "TrustZone".
Il che suggerisce che Samsung stia considerando che un utente malintenzionato con accesso root può comunque fare qualsiasi danno, ma non riesce a comprendere che vari attacchi ti porteranno a fare il root. Non sono sicuro di quello che provo per questo.
Un ulteriore aggiornamento sulla stessa pagina ora dice:
Apparently Samsung said in their press release that user should try out My Knox, as Knox Personal is deprecated. I just tried to install it but sadly My Knox only works on Samsung Galaxy S5 and Samsung Galaxy Note4. So Samsung, you're leaving all devices older than the S5 with a vulnerable version of Samsung Knox??
Quindi è una correzione ma solo su hardware più recente che funziona con la funzione TrustZone.