Sì, un computer quantistico perfettamente funzionante potrebbe risolvere i problemi complessi che sono alla base della crittografia a chiave pubblica. E sì, i sistemi D-Wave hanno effettivamente prodotto una macchina che sembra avere alcune caratteristiche dell'informatica quantistica. Ma D-Wave deve ancora dimostrare che il suo computer soddisfa tutti i criteri dell'informatica quantistica necessari per risolvere problemi come il problema RSA oppure il problema del logaritmo discreto .
In effetti alcuni esperti dubitano che il computer D-Wave debba essere considerato un computer quantico. Il professore associato del MIT Scott Aaronson ha scritto su il suo blog :
For me, three crucial points to keep in mind are:
(1) D-Wave still hasn’t demonstrated 2-qubit entanglement, which I see
as one of the non-negotiable “sanity checks” for scalable quantum
computing. In other words: if you’re producing entanglement, then you
might or might not be getting quantum speedups, but if you’re not
producing entanglement, then our current understanding fails to
explain how you could possibly be getting quantum speedups.
(2) Unfortunately, the fact that D-Wave’s machine solves some
particular problem in some amount of time, and a specific classical
computer running (say) simulated annealing took more time, is not (by
itself) good evidence that D-Wave was achieving the speedup because of
quantum effects. Keep in mind that D-Wave has now spent ~$100 million
and ~10 years of effort on a highly-optimized, special-purpose
computer for solving one specific optimization problem. So, as I like
to put it, quantum effects could be playing the role of “the stone in
a stone soup”: attracting interest, investment, talented people, etc.
to build a device that performs quite well at its specialized task,
but not ultimately because of quantum coherence in that device.
(3) The quantum algorithm on which D-Wave’s business model is based —
namely, the quantum adiabatic algorithm — has the property that it
“degrades gracefully” to classical simulated annealing when the
decoherence rate goes up. This, fundamentally, is the thing that
makes it difficult to know what role, if any, quantum coherence is
playing in the performance of their device. If they were trying to
use Shor’s algorithm to factor numbers, the situation would be much
more clear-cut: a decoherent version of Shor’s algorithm just gives
you random garbage. But a decoherent version of the adiabatic
algorithm still gives you a pretty good (but now essentially
”classical”) algorithm, and that’s what makes it hard to understand
what’s going on here.
Quindi, almeno per ora, non esiste un computer quantico pratico che possa minare la crittografia a chiave pubblica, né è previsto nel prossimo futuro. Alcuni esperti ritengono che sia ancora molto lontano.
BTW, per una grande analisi dell'impatto di un futuro computer quantistico sulla crittografia, raccomanderei post del blog di Matthew Green su questo argomento.